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15 February 1965

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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
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
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\*South Vietnam: Dr. Phan Huy Quat appears close to agreement on a cabinet.

[Quat claimed yesterday that he had reached tentative agreement with General Khanh and other key generals on his proposed cabinet list, although a last-minute hitch may develop over the interior ministry post. Khanh allegedly is pushing a candidate with a somewhat unsavory and possibly pro-neutralist background. Final decision on this appointment has been deferred.]

[As it now appears to be shaping up, Quat's government will be broadly based with an eye toward regional, religious and political balance, drawing on long-standing opponents of former President Diem. The military will be mainly represented by General Thieu, who is slated to serve as first deputy premier and minister of the armed forces. The armed forces will also control the psychological warfare and youth ministries.]

Quat is an experienced nationalist politician who has long been associated with the northern wing of the Dai Viet Party. He served creditably as foreign minister during General Khanh's premiership last year, although frictions are reported to have developed between the two men.

Quat's opportunity to form a government came this week end after similar efforts by Interior Minister Vien foundered over the opposition of the Buddhists and General Thi, the I Corps commander.

Over the past few months, Tri Quang and other Buddhist leaders have mentioned Quat favorably as a possible premier. His appointment might provide an early test of their willingness to let any government develop enough stability to prosecute the war effort.

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Sudan: Negotiations over the formation of a new cabinet are now under way in Khartoum.

The present leftist-dominated cabinet apparently decided last week to yield without a fight to the demands of the non-Communist parties for a reorganization. These parties--led by the Ansar religious brotherhood--had organized large numbers of tribesmen and were prepared to overturn the government by force if their demands were not met. The leftists, unable to mobilize similar mass popular support, probably now hope that their agreement to negotiate will enable them to salvage a few portfolios in the reorganized cabinet.

The parties clearly have the upper hand. They are undecided among themselves, however, over whether or not the Communists should be excluded completely and also on the question of when to announce a new government.

A delegation from the present regime is scheduled to begin negotiations with southern dissident leaders in Juba on 18 February. There is little chance that any compromise can be obtained with the southerners at this time, and the parties may be reluctant to assume responsibility for the meeting's failure.

The Ansari tribesmen are still standing by to forestall any leftist-sponsored demonstrations. [The army has not appeared on the scene, but would probably back the parties if their intervention to restore order should become necessary.]

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Turkey: The resignation of the Inonu government following defeat in a vote on the proposed budget will probably lead to formation of another shaky coalition government.

National elections are not scheduled until October 1965 but could be held sooner. The opposition Justice Party (JP), believed to have widespread popular support, might prefer immediate elections. The minor parties, however, which helped to topple Inonu probably would be opposed.

Inonu is expected to be designated a caretaker prime minister until a new government receives a vote of confidence. Some time may elapse before such a vote is possible unless the opposition parties were already agreed on the composition of a coalition cabinet prior to the budget vote.

\*It is unclear as to why the opposition decided to bring down the government at this time. The budget, because of its importance, probably was the best issue around which the opposition parties could coalesce. Inonu's insistence on considering the action a vote of no-confidence may also indicate that he, too, was not opposed to forcing a governmental crisis at this time. He may yet hope to be called upon to form another government if a viable coalition without his Republican People's Party can not be created.

Inonu's RPP, however, reportedly will not participate in any new government. Thus the JP, with 171 of the 450 seats in the National Assembly, will be the dominant party in any new coalition.

The new prime minister may not be from the JP, however. The present leader of that party is ineligible

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to become prime minister as he is not a member of parliament. This obstacle could be overcome by his appointment to a specially created parliamentary vacancy. Ekrem Alican, leader of the small New Turkey Party and a prominent opponent of Inonu in the budget debate, now appears the most likely choice to head a new coalition government.

Army leaders, who have supported Inonu since they returned the government to civilian rule in 1961, do not view the JP with favor.

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Turkey's basically pro-Western foreign policy is not expected to be affected by the change in power. The removal of Inonu's restraining influence on the army, however, could be detrimental to continuing efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the Cyprus dispute.

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NOTES

*on 14 Feb*  
Laos: The capture yesterday by the Communists of a key rightist position approximately 35 miles southwest of Samneua town in northern Laos will severely undermine resistance in the whole Samneua area. A Communist operation launched last month to clear this area had made only moderate gains in the face of air strikes by government T-28s. Rightist units are now deploying for a counterattack and an increase in T-28 sorties is planned, but there are indications that the Communists are strengthening their air defense capability. T

Jordan: King Husayn's appointment of Wasfi Tal on 13 February to head a new cabinet is part of a general effort by the King to revitalize his government. Husayn had become increasingly concerned over widespread charges of corruption against former prime minister Talhouni and his cabinet, and apparently decided some time ago to install a younger and more vigorous leadership. The appointment of Tal, however, whose dislike for Nasir is widely known, may complicate already delicate Jordanian-Egyptian relations.

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